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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between opacity and the cost of intermediation in Asian 
banks. Using a sample of publicly traded commercial banks from 2002 to 2008, our empirical 
results show that higher opacity is associated with a lower intermediation cost in banking. Hence, 
bank managers in their efforts to overcome asymmetric information issues and to improve 
transparency tend to offset the higher cost of acquiring and disclosing information by increasing 
the cost of intermediation for entrepreneurs. Moreover, a deeper look at the country level 
indicates that the negative link between opacity and the cost of intermediation is reversed as 
globalization increases. Greater globalization therefore outweighs managerial entrenchment 
behavior to preserve bank opacity. Our findings highlight that bank opacity issues are even more 
costly in countries with higher globalization.  
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1. Introduction 
 Financial crises in both developing and developed countries during the last two decades 
have highlighted the shortcomings of uncontrolled financial liberalization. On the one hand, 
financial liberalization has led to stronger financial development and has therefore reduced the 
opaqueness of bank loans, since the availability of credit information regarding borrowers’ 
financial health has increased (Rajan, 2005). Moreover, banks are now allowed to engage in 
securitization that enables them to accurately price their credit risk, while the development of 
structured products such as collateralized loan obligations also enables investors and rating 
agencies to price bank loans. On the other hand, financial development could also have created 
opportunities for bank managers to engage in more opaque activities, in order to substitute costs 
of monitoring to reduce asymmetric information related to bank loans (Wagner, 2007). 
For instance, in the case of the US, the end of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 has brought 
US banks to engage in off-balance-sheet activities. Wagner (2007) points out that the unused 
commitments of US commercial banks as a share of total assets have increased from 37% to 64% 
over the last two decades. The share of long-term loans in total loans in US banks has also 
increased from 15% to 25% in the same period2. In parallel, US banks have experienced a 
substantial increase in non-interest income as documented by Stiroh (2004) with a share of non-
interest income in total income growing rapidly from 19% in 1980 to 43% in 2004.  
 In countries with stricter restrictions on off-balance-sheet activities, it is rather difficult 
for banks to substitute their costs of acquiring and disclosing information on bank assets by 
engaging in off-balance-sheet activities. Such banks can thus offset their costs by increasing the 
intermediation cost (higher loan rates charged to borrowers and/or lower deposit rates). 
Meanwhile, whether or not promoting greater transparency has an impact on the intermediation 
cost in banking is an important issue that has, to our knowledge, not been examined before. This 
paper fills this gap in the literature by focusing on Asian countries where restrictions on off-
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 Long-term loans are typically more opaque than short-term loans, because borrowers’ financial health is rather 
difficult to measure over a longer horizon (Wagner, 2007). Some studies also highlight that an overall increase in 
bank opacity typically occurs in the long-run period. Morgan (2002) documents that the opacity of US banks 
relatively to that of non-bank institutions in the US has increased from 92% in 1983 to 109% in 1993. For European 
banks, Iannotta (2004) also points out that their opacity relatively to non-bank institutions has increased from 82% 
in 1993 to 100% in 2003. 
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balance-sheet activities are still high and the  share of non-interest income activities rather 
limited (Agusman et al., 2008; Adams, 2008).  
Specifically, we aim to test whether bank managers’ efforts to reduce opacity may be 
beneficial or detrimental for financial intermediation in Asian countries. Moreover, we also 
extend our analysis to examine whether the link between bank opacity and the intermediation 
cost is dependent on the level of institutional development. Indeed, institutional development has 
impacted the extent to which Asian countries have suffered from the 1997 Asian crisis which in 
turn has affected intermediation activities in those countries. For instance, Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998) document that Asian countries with weaker institutional development, such as Indonesia 
and Thailand, were severely affected by the 1997 Asian crisis.  
Our focus on the link between bank opacity and the intermediation cost in Asian 
countries is motivated by the following reasons. It is generally admitted that asymmetric 
information has contributed to exacerbate financial instability in Asia which triggered the 1997 
Asian crisis (Sau, 2003). In order to prevent financial crises in the future, reducing asymmetric 
information is therefore necessary. Surprisingly, previous literature has not examined the issue of 
whether reducing asymmetric information or promoting information transparency in banking has 
an impact on real economic activities stemming from movements in bank intermediation cost.  
Meanwhile, the banking sector remains a major source of finance for firms in Asian 
countries and therefore examining the ways to promote intermediation is essential in fostering 
economic growth in Asian countries (Adams, 2008). Yet, Asian banking has developed rapidly 
since the end of the 1997 crisis. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving Asian banks 
have increased from US$ 2.5 billion during 1991-1995 to US$ 65 billion during 2001-2005 
(Domanski, 2005; Moshirian, 2008). As the financial sector has rapidly grown in Asian 
countries, assessing the link between bank opacity and the intermediation cost has become an 
important issue because financial development exacerbates bank managers’ incentives to 
preserve the opacity of bank assets (Wagner, 2007). Consequently, it is important to examine 
whether such managerial entrenchment leads to a higher intermediation cost.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our research focus and 
relates it to previous literature. Section 3 describes the data, variables and methodology used in 
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this study. Section 4 discusses empirical findings and provides some robustness checks, while 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Related literature and research focus 
 The role of the banking sector in supporting economic growth has been widely explored 
and this issue is still broadly debated. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) are the first to demonstrate 
that the presence of banks as financial intermediaries enhances long-run economic growth 
because banks can optimize depositors’ funds to boost long-term savings and investments. In 
contrast, a large number of papers also indicate the presence of threshold effects.  Hence, the link 
between financial intermediation and development is not necessarily positive (e.g. Augier and 
Soedarmono, 2011; Deidda and Fattouh, 2002; Bose and Cothren, 1996 & 1997)3.  
 As a matter of fact, the presence of asymmetric information is one of the factors that 
make the link between finance and development rather ambiguous. The financial intermediation 
approach developed by Diamond (1984) shows that bank loans are opaque and hence, the cost of 
monitoring to reduce asymmetric information in bank loans can affect financial intermediation 
via its impact on the lending rate. In a similar vein, Bose and Cothren (1997) show that banking 
development can enhance capital accumulation and long-run growth, when the cost of acquiring 
information from screening activities falls below a threshold level. This result can be further 
interpreted that the expertise of banks in overcoming asymmetric information plays a critical role 
in making the economy move toward a credit screening equilibrium rather than a credit rationing 
equilibrium.  
 The empirical literature shows that the extent of asymmetric information strongly affects 
the development and the stability of the banking sector. Tsai et al (2011) show that banks are 
more likely to expand operations in countries with a credit reporting bureau, where shared credit 
reports are of better quality in terms of timeliness, accuracy and completeness. Banks are thus 
likely to expand in countries with lower asymmetric information. In parallel, the stock market 
also suffers from asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. Hence, financial 
liberalization that fosters stock market development too rapidly can exacerbate asymmetric 
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 See Levine (2005) for a comprehensive literature review on the finance-growth nexus. 
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information and deteriorate bank stability ending up in banking crises (Bhide, 1993; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detagriache, 1999).  
  From these studies, it is indeed clear that the presence of asymmetric information plays a 
significant role in affecting financial development and stability. However, there is no previous 
study that provides empirical evidence on the impact of asymmetric information in banking on 
economic activities in particular. The present paper attempts to contribute in this direction. 
Specifically, we build on the work of Bose and Cothren (1997) and Wagner (2007) to examine 
the link between asymmetric information and the cost of intermediation in banking.  
According to Bose and Cothren (1997), the extent to which bank assets are opaque 
determines the cost of acquiring information which in turn determines capital stock 
accumulation. In the present paper, instead of focusing on capital stock accumulation and 
economic growth, we examine whether bank managers in their efforts to overcome asymmetric 
information, tend to offset higher cost of acquiring and disclosing information by increasing the 
intermediation cost for entrepreneurs. In other words, we test the link between bank opacity and 
the intermediation cost. As further contributions, we also examine whether the link between bank 
opacity and intermediation cost is country-specific.  
Poghosyan (2013) highlights that institutional development plays a crucial role in 
affecting the cost of bank intermediation. Lower institutional quality is found to increase the 
intermediation cost. Building on this work, we test whether institutional development matters in 
affecting the link between opacity and the intermediation cost in banking. Given that our study 
focuses on the role of informational transparency, we therefore emphasize on institutional 
development related to the degree of countries’ openness that integrates information-sharing 
activities. We use the globalization index developed by Dreher et al. (2008) as a proxy of 
institutional development that contains a measure of economic globalization, political 
globalization, and social globalization which include transparency in terms of information flows. 
Dreher et al. (2008) empirically show that the overall index of globalization is indeed positively 
associated with economic growth.  
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3. Data, variables and methodology  
3.1. Data sources 
 In order to assess the link between opacity and the intermediation cost in banking, we use 
several sources of data. Bank-level data are retrieved from BankScope Fitch IBCA. Only 
publicly traded banks (i.e. listed on a stock exchange) are considered in this study because our 
framework requires the use of data on bank stock prices. Due to such restrictions, our sample 
consists of an unbalanced panel of 253 listed commercial banks for the 2002-2008 period that 
operate in 13 Asian developed and developing countries4. These countries include China (14), 
Hong Kong (6), Japan (87), South Korea (7), Taiwan (12), Indonesia (25), Malaysia (4), 
Philippines (12), Singapore (3), Thailand (11), Pakistan (23), India (40, and Sri Lanka (9).  
We consider daily stock price data for each bank in our sample and also the daily global 
market indices at the country level. Such market data come from Thomson Datastream 
International. For deeper insights on whether the link between opacity and the intermediation 
cost in banking depends on the quality of institutions, we also retrieve the index of globalization 
(GLOBAL) from Dreher et al (2008) as a proxy of institutional development to reflect the degree 
of openness in various aspects including the economic, social and political dimensions. To 
construct our macroeconomic control variables, we retrieve data from International Financial 
Statistics provided by the International Monetary Fund, except for the ratio of bank concentration 
(CONC) which is retrieved from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
 
3.2. Bank intermediation cost 
 In order to measure the bank intermediation cost, we consider the ratio of net interest 
income to total assets or net interest margin (NIM). NIM is widely used as a proxy of bank 
intermediation cost in the previous literature (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 1999; Dabla-Norris and Floerkeimer, 2007; Naceur and Kandil, 2009). Banks’ net 
interest margin can be considered as a price markup to offset higher costs related to banking 
operations in lending, monitoring and deposit activities. Higher net interest margin implies that 
banks are likely to experience a higher intermediation cost which they in turn transfer to their 
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 The choice of countries included in our sample builds on Soedarmono et al. (2013), and Agusman et al. (2008) 
who study Asian banks, except that we add Japan and China.The values in parentheses are the number of banks. 
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customers (higher loan rates for borrowers and/or lower rates for depositors). Following 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004), we also consider the ratio of overhead cost to total assets (OVER) 
as an alternative proxy of the bank intermediation cost.  
Some papers consider that higher net interest margins merely reflect higher profitability 
in banking instead of higher intermediation cost charged to borrowers (e.g. Naceur and Kandil, 
2009; Naceur and Oman, 2011). For robustness considerations, we build another measure to 
capture the intermediation cost. More precisely, we consider a net interest margin measure which 
is adjusted for profitability (RNIM). This measure reflects a markup price that “purely” captures 
the motivation of bank managers to offset costs of banking operations which are in turn 
positively associated with the bank's intermediation cost, i.e. the margin charged to borrowers. 
RNIM is computed using the residual terms of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of 
NIM on both return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE)5. Accordingly, RNIM captures 
movements in the net interest margin that are not influenced by changes in bank profitability. 
Overall, higher NIM, RNIM and OVER are all associated with a higher intermediation cost in 
banking. 
 
3.3. Bank opacity 
We assess the degree of bank opacity using an indicator of bank stock price synchronicity 
(SYNC). Previous empirical studies support the use of stock price synchronicity to account for 
the extent of information reflected in stock prices and hence, determining firms’ transparency. 
Roll (1988) documents that the weak relationship between firms’ stock price and market price 
movements is due to the fact that more firm-specific information can be reflected in individual 
firms’ stock prices. In other words, the relative amounts of firm-specific information 
incorporated in stock prices determine whether or not individual firms’ stock prices move 
together in the same direction with the stock market index.  
If firm-specific environments (e.g. firms’ disclosure policies, analyst reports, or 
institutional factors including property rights protection, the quality of government and legal 
origin) cause individual firms’ stock prices to aggregate more firm-specific information, stock 
price synchronicity should be lower (Morck et al, 2000; Durnev et al., 2003; Chan and Hameed, 
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 ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, while ROE is the ratio of net income to total equity.  
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2006; Jin and Myers, 2006; Piotroski and Roustone, 2004). In this case, R-squared from a 
standard market model that reflects a firm's stock return synchronicity should be lower, while 
firm-specific return variation should be higher. By extension, a firm's transparency tends to be 
higher in this regard (Jin and Myers, 2006). 
Following Chan and Hameed (2006), we compute opacity (SYNC) using stock price 
synchronicity which is estimated from a standard market model defined as follows: 
is
m
jsiijs rr                                 (1) 
From Equation (1), ijsr  is the stock return on bank i in country j on day s, while mjsr  is the daily 
market return computed on the basis of domestic market indexes in country j on day s. Both 
variables are defined as follows: 
 1log ijsijsijs ppr               
  1),( ),(log sjm sjmmjs ppr          
Accordingly, ijsp  is the stock price of bank i in country j on day s, while sjmp ),(  is the global 
market price index in country j on day s.  
 In the next stage, we run regressions from 2002 to 2008 to estimate Equation (1) using 
the OLS method following Bautista et al (2009). For each year, we eliminate banks with trading 
days less than 70% of the total number of trading days per year. As such, we obtain the annual 
2R  from bank stock i in country j at year t. Given the bounded nature of 2R  between zero and 
one, we then apply a logistic transformation. The degree of bank synchronicity is thus defined as  
  2
2
1
log
ijt
ijt
ijt R
R
SYNC                       (2) 
From Equation (2), a higher 2R  reflects higher bank stock price synchronicity (SYNC), i.e. the 
stock price predominantly moves in the same direction as the global market index. In such a 
case, the weaker bank-specific information content can be incorporated in the bank stock price 
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and hence, bank-level information disclosure in bank stock prices is also weaker because of 
stronger opacity problems.  
To our best knowledge, prior studies on firm transparency mainly have mainly focused 
on non-financial firms (e.g. Ball, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Chan and Hameed, 2006; Gul 
et al., 2010). Although the need for bank transparency to strengthen market discipline is widely 
recognized (Flannery, 1998), only Francis et al (2012) have examined the determinants of stock 
return synchronicity in the banking industry. We hence contribute to the scarce literature 
lookingat stock price synchronicity to account for opacity in banking..  
Nevertheless, several studies also cast doubts on the use of bank stock price synchronicity 
as a valid measure to assess the extent to which firms are transparent (e.g. Dasgupta et al., 2010; 
Ashbauh-Skife et al., 2006). As a validity check, we follow Gul et al. (2010) to test whether 
stock price synchronicity can ascertain the extent to which banks are transparent or opaque. In 
doing so, we build the following regression model: 
          
                              (3) 
 
MAR is the market-adjusted bank stock return measured by the difference between 
annualized bank stock returns and annualized capital market returns. NI is the ratio of net income 
to the market value of equity. EQTA and MTBV represent the ratio of total equity to total assets, 
and the market-to-book-value ratio, respectively. Meanwhile, NI*EQTA and NI*MTBV are 
control variables as used by Gul et al. (2010). To estimate Equation (3), we include both 
individual and time-fixed effects. SYNC can be considered as a valid measure of bank opacity 
when 1 is positive but 2 is negative. This suggests that capital markets can attach higher 
value to earnings, but only in banks with lower synchronicity. As synchronicity becomes higher, 
the positive link between NI and MAR is reversed. Opacity problems therefore occur because 
earnings information capitalized into stock prices becomes lower in high-synchronicity banks. 
 
3.4. Control variables 
 To control for other factors that explain movements in the bank intermediation cost, 
control variables representing both bank-specific and country-specific factors are incorporated in 
errorMTBVNI
EQTANISYNCNINIMAR
ijt
ijtijtijtijt   * **4 3210  
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the regressions. For bank-specific control variables, we consider the ratio of total equity to total 
assets (EQTA), the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LLP), the loan-to-deposit ratio 
(LDR) and the logarithm of banks’ total assets (SIZE). To control for differences in the 
macroeconomic environment and market structure, we consider three indicators which are the 
bank concentration ratio measured by the share of the three largest banks’ total assets in the 
banking system’s total assets (CR3), the growth rate of real per capita income (GDPG), and the 
inflation rate (INF).  
 Higher EQTA is likely to increase bank net interest margin because of a decline in 
funding costs, since higher EQTA can reduce bank default risk which in turn decreases funding 
costs (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2004). LLP and LDR are incorporated to account for credit risk and 
intermediation activities, respectively. Banks with higher credit risk are expected to charge a 
higher lending rate resulting in a higher intermediation cost. Meanwhile, as higher LDR is 
associated with more lending activities, higher loan-to-deposit ratio is expected to increase the 
intermediation cost because banks tend to offset higher monitoring costs related to lending 
activities. In addition, SIZE is also included to control for “too-big-to-fail” effects that might 
affect banks’ loan pricing behavior. However, the expected sign of the link between SIZE and the 
intermediation cost is ambiguous. Larger banks could charge lower rates because they do not 
fear distress. They can also benefit from lower funding cost (lower deposit rates) because of 
higher confidence from depositors (higher bail-out probability). 
 With regards to macroeconomic control variables, a higher bank concentration ratio 
(CR3) is expected to increase the bank intermediation cost because banks in concentrated 
markets are able to charge higher lending rates (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004). Moreover, 
considering economic growth (GDPG), which is standard in the literature is also important in 
order to reflect business cycle movements. Changes in economic growth are expected to change 
business opportunities for banks. However, the sign of the link between economic growth and 
the intermediation cost is unclear, since it depends on banks’ expertise in dealing with changes in 
the business cycle. Finally, we also control for the inflation rate (INF) because a higher inflation 
rate can lead to a higher bank net interest margin as shown by Huybens and Smith (1999).  
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3.5. Methodology 
Our analysis is conducted in several stages. In the first stage, we compute a measure of 
bank stock price synchronicity (SYNC). In the second stage, a validity check is conducted using 
Equation (3) to ensure that SYNC can be used to assess the degree of bank opacity. In the next 
turn, the link between bank opacity and intermediation cost is empirically examined.  
Once the general results are obtained, we further examine whether the degree of 
globalization at the country level alters the link between bank opacity and intermediation cost. 
For this purpose we interact SYNC with the index of globalization (GLOBAL) and focus on the 
coefficient of SYNC*GLOBAL. The index of globalization (GLOBAL) indicates the extent to 
which countries are open in terms of economic, political and social dimensions that integrate 
information-sharing activities in those countries. GLOBAL is the overall index of globalization or 
the KOF Index of Globalization developed by Dreher et al. (2008) which integrates all aspects of 
globalization, i.e. social, economic and political dimensions of globalization. 
 In terms of econometric methodology in examining the link between opacity and the 
intermediation cost in banking, we use a dynamic panel model. Recent studies on the 
determinants of bank performance recommend the use of dynamic panel data methodology (e.g. 
Naceur and Kandil, 2009; Naceur and Omran, 2011), since the current intermediation cost can be 
affected by its past values due to managerial anticipation or learning. Hence, the use of a 
dynamic panel model is more relevant than a static panel model to capture such possible 
behavior i.e. to control for a possible autoregressive process in the bank intermediation cost 
variable. Nevertheless, our concern in this study is more to examine the impact of bank opacity 
on the intermediation cost rather than the speed of adjustment of the bank intermediation cost. 
 Accordingly, we test the following models. Equation (4) is to test the impact of bank 
opacity (SYNC) on the intermediation cost (COST), while Equation (5) is to test whether such a 
relationship is dependent on the degree of globalization at the country level, respectively6.  
 
errorINFGDPGCRSIZE
LDRLLPEQTASYNCCOSTCOST
jtjtjtijt
ijtijtijtijtijtijt    87615 432110 3                     (4) 
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 COST represents a set of dependent variables that capture the bank intermediation cost. These include NIM, OVER, 
and RNIM.  
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errorINFGDPG
CONCSIZELDRLLPEQTA
GLOBALGLOBALSYNCSYNCCOSTCOST
jtjt
jtijtijtijtijt
jtijtijtijtijt
 
 
109
87654
32110 *
 

                           (5) 
 
 In estimating all the regressions, we follow Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) using the two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator or the System 
GMM. The System GMM is the extension of the Standard GMM developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), where the first-differenced equation is combined with the level equation in order to 
produce better outputs than the Standard GMM (Baltagi, 2005). This combination is essential, 
particularly when variables are close to a random walk. In running the System GMM, we also 
consider finite sample corrections proposed by Windmeijer (2005) to ensure that our estimated 
coefficients are robust. Since our dynamic panel data models contain an autoregressive variable, 
we account for the orthogonal deviation transformations of instruments to control for possible 
bank-level fixed effects. Overall, the System GMM is valid if AR (2) test and Hansen-J test are 
both insignificant. This indicates that there is no second-order autocorrelation among errors of 
first-differenced equation, and our identifying restrictions are valid, respectively.  
 On the whole, all the estimations from Equation (3) to Equation (5) are conducted 
separately for two different bank samples. The first sample includes all the banks operating in the 
considered 13 Asian countries. Meanwhile, the second sample excludes, as a robustness check, 
Japanese banks which dominate our sample, to ensure that our results are not affected by 
Japanese banks’ characteristics.   
 
4. Empirical results 
 In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study. We 
also impose restrictions to the ratio of total equity to total assets (EQTA) to eliminate possible 
outliers. Specifically, we eliminate values in EQTA that are lower than zero. Banks with negative 
EQTA may not fully operate in the market because they may require assistance from bank 
regulators or the lender of last resort.  
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 Moreover, Table 2 presents the correlation structures of all the variables used to analyze 
the link between opacity and intermediation cost in banking. It shows that the independent 
variables included in Equations (4) and (5) are not strongly correlated and hence, that our 
regressions do not suffer from multicollinearity issues.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Given that the previous literature cast doubts on the use of bank synchronicity as a 
measure of bank opacity, we test whether bank stock price synchronicity can be a valid proxy of 
bank opacity. Table 3 presents the empirical results for Equation (3). The ratio of net income to 
the market value of equity (NI) has a positive and significant relationship with the market-
adjusted return of banks (MAR). Such a relationship is however reversed for NI*SYNC, 
suggesting that higher SYNC reduces the likeliness of the market to attach a higher value to bank 
earnings. In this regard, SYNC reflects the extent to which banks may suffer from opacity 
problems. These results hold for both the overall bank sample and the non-Japanese bank 
sample.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 To ensure the robustness of our results, we repeat estimations for Equation (3) by 
replacing MAR with BSR which represents the annualized bank stock return. It appears that 
higher NI is still associated with higher BSR, particularly for low-synchronicity banks. For high-
synchronicity banks, the positive relationship between NI and BSR is reversed, supporting the 
notion that higher synchronicity precludes the incorporation of bank-specific information into 
bank stock prices. High-synchronicity banks are thus more likely to suffer from opacity problems 
than low-synchronicity banks. These results remain unaltered when we include or exclude 
Japanese banks from our estimations. 
14 
 
From the above discussion, our indicator of bank synchronicity can be considered as a 
valid proxy to assess the degree of bank opacity. Table 4 then presents our empirical results with 
regards to the impact of bank opacity on the intermediation cost for the overall bank sample and 
the sample from which Japanese banks are excluded.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
For the overall bank sample, we document that higher bank opacity is associated with a 
lower intermediation cost measured by NIM or RNIM. Our dynamic panel data models are also 
valid, given that the AR (2) test and the Hansen-J test are not rejected at least at the 5% level. 
These findings still hold when we exclude Japanese banks from our sample. Our findings are 
therefore consistent with the notion that disclosing and sharing information is costly due to 
managerial entrenchment effects. Since bank managers tend to preserve the opacity of banks’ 
assets as in Wagner (2007), low-synchronicity (or transparent) banks are more likely to exhibit a 
higher intermediation cost than high-synchronicity (opaque) banks. Accordingly, the managers 
of transparent banks tend to offset costs of acquiring and disclosing information by increasing 
the cost of credit for entrepreneurs due to the entrenchment effect. On the other hand, higher 
transparency can also reduce the cost of bank deposits because of higher confidence of bank 
depositors. In this case as well, the cost of intermediation may in turn increase, although the cost 
of credit does not increase.   
When we consider the role of the degree of globalization (GLOBAL), we find that the 
negative impact of bank opacity on the intermediation cost is more pronounced in countries with 
lower globalization. As globalization at the country level increases, the negative link between 
bank opacity and intermediation cost is reversed, especially when we use NIM or OVER as a 
proxy of the bank intermediation cost as shown in Table 5. The negative coefficient on SYNC is 
more than outweighed by the positive coefficient on SYNC*GLOBAL (the absolute value of the 
coefficient of SYNC*GLOBAL is higher than the absolute value of the coefficient of SYNC). An 
increase in SYNC will lead to a decrease in the cost of intermediation if the value taken by 
GLOBAL is very low, but to an increase in the cost of intermediation for higher values taken by 
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GLOBAL 7.  We lose a substantial number of observations in this stage because Dreher et al. 
(2008) do not provide data on globalization indices for Hong Kong and Taiwan, and our sample 
incorporates publicly-traded commercial banks from both countries. But in Table 5, our dynamic 
panel data models remain valid, since AR (2) test and Hansen-J test are not rejected, at least at 
the 5% level.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
In countries with greater globalization, bank opacity might increase the cost of 
intermediation possibly because of the following reasons. Countries with greater globalization 
have greater openness in terms of economic, political and social dimensions and hence, demand 
for greater transparency in various aspects tends to be higher. With regards to banking activities, 
agents from such countries are also likely to require information of better quality and better 
financial services. Consequently, banks with higher opacity problems in countries with greater 
globalization tend to face higher demand for transparency which may in turn outweigh bank 
managerial entrenchment effects to preserve opacity. In turn, the bank intermediation cost might 
be positively linked with opacity in countries with greater globalization. In order to enhance 
financial intermediation, efforts to improve bank-level transparency are therefore necessary in 
such countries.   
 Furthermore, because bank opacity problems can also exacerbate asymmetric information 
issues that could possibly lead to financial instability (Sau, 2003), efforts to increase bank-level 
transparency in countries with lower globalization remain important. However, bank regulators 
in countries with lower globalization need to deal with managerial entrenchment effects by 
promoting bank-level transparency because bank managers in such countries tend to offset the 
cost of acquiring and disclosing information by increasing the cost of intermediation.   
 In the meantime, most of the control variables fulfill our expected signs. EQTA as the 
equity-to-asset ratio has a positive impact on the cost of intermediation. This result remains 
                                                          
7
 The marginal effect of an increase in SYNC is equal to 1 2 ijtGLOBAL  which for instance in the first 
equation of table 5 (column 1) is positive for values of GLOBAL higher than 0,28793/0,43282 = 0.66524. In our 
sample, GLOBAL ranges from 0.4616 to 0.8915 (see Table 1).  
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robust whether or not we exclude Japanese banks from our sample. Higher bank credit risk (LLP) 
is also found to exacerbate the cost of intermediation in both the overall bank sample and the 
non-Japanese bank sample. Bank size (SIZE) is also positively associated with a higher 
intermediation cost for the overall bank sample and the non-Japanese bank sample. With regards 
to macroeconomic control variables, a higher bank concentration ratio (CR3) and a higher 
inflation (INF) also exacerbate the intermediation cost, while stronger economic growth (GDPG) 
has a negative impact onit. These results hold whether or not we exclude Japanese banks from 
the sample. 
  
5. Additional robustness checks 
 Although our empirical results regarding the link between intermediation cost and 
opacity in banking are robust to different measures of the bank intermediation cost, as well as to 
different sample definitions that exclude or include Japanese banks, we conduct additional 
robustness checks to ensure that our results are not biased. First, given that Asian countries 
differ in terms of the depth of financial markets which may in turn affect the extent to which 
bank-specific information can be incorporated in bank stock prices, we focus on countries that 
have similar levels of financial market development. Accordingly, we exclude banks operating in 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from our sample. Our empirical results remain identical when we 
ignore these three countries. Higher opacity leads to a lower intermediation cost in banking, but 
this relationship is reversed as globalization at the country-level increases. 
 Second, Dreher et al. (2008) do not provide globalization data on Hong Kong and Taiwan 
and hence, we also exclude banks from these two countries. Our results are unaltered, with 
higher opacity leading to higher intermediation cost in banking. 
Third, as we only consider listed banks in our study, which are more likely to be 
categorized as large banks in their countries, we exclude SIZE from the control variables as 
stated from Equation (4) and (5). Using this new specification does not alter our empirical 
results.  
Finally, we exclude the year 2008 to eliminate the possible effects of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. We thus conduct regressions for Equation (4) and (5) using the 2002-2007 period 
and still find a negative link between opacity and the intermediation cost. In addition, in 
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countries with greater globalization, the negative link between opacity and the intermediation 
cost in banking is still reversed.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 Using a sample of publicly traded commercial banks in 13 Asian countries, this paper 
examines how bank opacity is valued by bank managers through its relationship with the cost of 
bank intermediation. Our empirical results reveal that higher opacity is associated with lower 
intermediation cost in banking. This result provides empirical support for the theoretical work by 
Wagner (2007) who argues that bank opacity is positively valued by bank managers who tend to 
preserve it. Similarly, we also provide empirical support for the theoretical model built by Bose 
and Cothern (1997) who find that bank managers, in their efforts to alleviate asymmetric 
information and enhance transparency, tend to offset the cost of acquiring and disclosing 
information by increasing monitoring costs that in turn hinders economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the negative link between bank opacity and the intermediation cost is also 
conditional on the degree of globalization at the country level. In countries with greater 
globalization, the negative link between bank opacity and the intermediation cost is reversed. 
Greater globalization therefore seems to outweigh the managerial entrenchment to preserve bank 
opacity. As such, higher bank opacity leads to a higher bank intermediation cost in countries 
with greater globalization. These findings show that managerial entrenchment effects that lead to 
greater incentives for bank managers to preserve bank opacity are more likely to occur in 
countries with lower globalization. 
On the whole, our findings highlight the importance of bank transparency to promote 
better financial intermediation, particularly in countries with greater globalization. Efforts to 
enhance bank transparency in less globalized countries is also important. However, bank 
regulators in less globalized countries need to consider mechanisms to overcome bank 
managerial entrenchment because bank managers’ efforts to enhance bank-level transparency 
can exacerbate the intermediation cost.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variables Observations Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MAR 1372 Market-adjusted return 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0054 0.0285 
NIM 1579 Ratio of net interest income to total assets (%) 2.4309 1.6210 -13.9801 17.3763 
OVER 1581 Ratio of overhead cost to total assets (%) 2.0776 1.4738 0.5902 15.3612 
RNIM 1579 Profitability-adjusted net interest margin (%) 1.9864 3.4270 -63.6857 16.3468 
SYNC 1493 Bank stock price synchronicity -1.3455 1.6990 -8.4440 2.9816 
EQTA 1582 Ratio of total equity to total assets 0.0722 0.0619 0.0010 0.5787 
LLP 1529 Ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 0.0083 0.0452 -1.1935 0.3007 
LDR 1575 Ratio of total loans to total deposits 0.7144 0.3160 0.0460 5.7180 
SIZE 1582 Logarithm of bank total assets 9.0476 1.7448 2.1699 14.1715 
CONC 1771 Bank concentration ratio from 3 largest banks 0.4726 0.1454 0.2560 1.0000 
GDPG 1771 Growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product  0.0433 0.0287 -0.0030 0.1190 
INF 1267 Inflation rate  0.0236 0.0353 -0.0337 0.1314 
GLOBAL 1579 Globalization index 0.5763 0.0686 0.4616 0.8915 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of main variables. 
 
  NIM OVER RNIM SYNC EQTA LLP LDR SIZE CR3 GDPG INF GLOBAL 
NIM 1 
           OVER 0.6905 1 
          RNIM 0.6317 0.4918 1 
         SYNC -0.1572 -0.2867 -0.1575 1 
        EQTA 0.5750 0.5394 0.0608 -0.0703 1 
       LLP 0.0295 -0.0861 0.6025 0.0851 -0.2888 1 
      LDR 0.3187 0.2990 -0.0373 -0.0778 0.3838 -0.4767 1 
     SIZE -0.3824 -0.6155 -0.3021 0.6332 -0.4130 0.1014 -0.1835 1 
    CR3 0.2817 0.2800 0.1982 -0.0031 0.2404 0.0020 0.2466 -0.1818 1 
   GDPG 0.2984 0.2459 0.1332 0.0451 0.2450 0.0102 -0.0674 -0.0284 0.1653 1 
  INF 0.5083 0.5788 0.3462 -0.2018 0.3680 0.0026 -0.0563 -0.4491 0.1734 0.6011 1 
 GLOBAL -0.2744 -0.3656 -0.2361 0.2908 -0.0499 0.0041 0.0107 0.3323 -0.1121 0.0170 -0.3082 1 
 
Source and notes: Authors’ calculation. NIM is the ratio of net interest income to total assets. OVER is the ratio of overhead cost to total assets. RNIM is the 
profitability-adjusted net interest margin measured by the residual term of an OLS regression of NIM on both return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
SYNC is the index of bank opacity. EQTA is the ratio of equity capital to total assets. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. LDR is the ratio of 
total loans to total deposits. SIZE is the logarithm of banks’ total assets. CR3 is the share of three largest banks’ total assets over banking system’s total assets. 
GDPG is the gross domestic product growth rate. INF is the inflation rate. GLOBAL is the index of globalization.  
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Table 3. Validity checks for SYNC as a measure of bank opacity 
 
 
  Overall banks Non-Japanese banks 
  MAR BSR MAR BSR 
NI 0.04616** 0.06139* 0.06292* 0.0799** 
  (0.0274) (0.03186) (0.0363) (0.0394) 
NI*SYNC -0.03721*** -0.04274*** -0.03294*** -0.0378*** 
  (0.0075) (0.00868) (0.0099) (0.01078) 
NI*EQTA -0.11792 -0.17484 -0.18684 -0.24431* 
  (0.10002) (0.11634) (0.1319) (0.14282) 
NI*MTBV -0.00561 -0.01074 -0.00632 -0.00954 
  (0.00625) (0.00727) (0.00811) (0.00869) 
Adj. R-square 0.11 0.27 0.06 0.36 
Observations 1119 1119 569 569 
 
Source and notes: Authors’ calculation. MAR is the annualized market-adjusted daily return and measured by the difference between bank stock return and total 
stock market return. BSR is bank stock return. NI is the ratio of net income to the market value of equity. SYNC is the measure of bank stock price synchronicity 
that will be expected to depict bank opacity level. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. MTBV is the market-to-book value ratio. Models are estimated 
using Fixed Effects regressions controlling both bank-specific and time-specific effects. 
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Table 4. Opacity (SYNC) and intermediation cost in banking (NIM, OVER, RNIM) 
 
 Overall banks Non-Japanese banks 
  
NIM OVER RNIM NIM OVER RNIM 
Dependent variable (-1) 0.81396*** 0.62730*** -0.02738 0.81046*** 0.53809*** -0.00233 
 (0.07902) (0.14392) (0.11073) (0.09583) (0.13895) (0.11525) 
SYNC -0.01924** -0.02097 -0.11019*** -0.03386 -0.03961 -0.21655*** 
 (0.01079) (0.01682) (0.03711) (0.02523) (0.03057) (0.06071) 
EQTA 2.52393* 4.20632*** -1.33037 4.69394* 4.31118** -2.51737 
 (1.50261) (1.61106) (3.07489) (2.52605) (1.98141) (2.44779) 
LLP -0.19520 3.14260** 31.28173*** -0.34466 2.76189** 27.30138*** 
 (1.53360) (1.40452) (3.96093) (1.36322) (1.26917) (2.69056) 
LDR -0.05494 0.45998 1.81778*** -0.26134* 0.48503 1.12108*** 
 (0.16472) (0.30250) (0.56913) (0.13359) (0.43017) (0.41463) 
SIZE 0.01977** -0.01758 -0.03197 0.05580*** 0.00823 0.06756 
 (0.00945) (0.01696) (0.04848) (0.01999) (0.03202) (0.05523) 
CR3 -0.08926 0.14032 0.93097** -0.16001 0.13639 1.18912* 
 (0.11384) (0.16701) (0.40210) (0.23649) (0.31465) (0.67396) 
GDPG 0.00509 -0.01329 -0.03355* -0.03226 -0.04406 -0.12403** 
 (0.00684) (0.00970) (0.01905) (0.02389) (0.03124) (0.05021) 
INF 0.03237** 0.04026 0.16034*** 0.01519 0.05722** 0.14644*** 
 (0.01271) (0.02540) (0.02957) (0.01465) (0.02503) (0.03752) 
Observations 868 870 868 371 371 371 
p-value for AR(1) test 0.020 0.007 0.043 0.001 0.016 0.078 
p-value for AR(2) test 0.105 0.818 0.148 0.092 0.991 0.192 
p-value for Hansen-J test 0.099 0.047 0.095 0.064 0.076 0.085 
 
Source and notes: Authors’ calculation. The definition of variables follows Table 1. Dynamic panel data models use the two-step GMM dynamic panel 
estimators with Windmeijer’s robust finite sample correction, taking into account the orthogonal deviation transformations of instruments. Dynamic panel data 
models are valid if AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are not rejected. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
. 
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Table 5. Opacity (SYNC), globalization (GLOBAL) and intermediation cost in banking (NIM, RNIM, OVER).  
 
 Overall banks Non-Japanese banks 
  NIM OVER RNIM NIM OVER RNIM 
       
Dependent variable (-1) 0.78234*** 0.66376*** -0.07908 0.71845*** 0.52442*** -0.06684 
 (0.05572) (0.13551) (0.07475) (0.04973) (0.14015) (0.08895) 
SYNC -0.28793** -0.34998* -0.48131 -0.81305*** -0.97318** -0.33359 
 (0.13761) (0.20284) (0.52962) (0.24154) (0.46122) (0.74913) 
SYNC*GLOBAL 0.43282** 0.55185* 0.63795 1.24290*** 1.60860** 0.26884 
 (0.22515) (0.32012) (0.85905) (0.40766) (0.79917) (1.23997) 
GLOBAL -0.48125 0.16337 0.92209 -1.88305*** 0.10697 -0.60559 
 (0.36574) (0.42748) (1.18504) (0.65818) (1.06811) (1.72896) 
EQTA 3.17287** 3.90234** -1.97567 7.60615*** 3.97179** -2.47059 
 (1.44350) (1.54246) (3.89122) (2.13834) (1.71977) (2.90629) 
LLP 0.56651 3.18000*** 28.40958*** 1.12616 2.45650*** 25.34682*** 
 (1.48654) (1.21313) (4.72982) (1.21457) (0.90546) (2.07790) 
LDR 0.04490 0.44378* 1.53951** -0.18739 0.46569 1.11349*** 
 (0.17977) (0.23954) (0.77750) (0.14479) (0.31697) (0.39559) 
SIZE 0.04185* -0.03155 -0.06647 0.18418*** 0.01440 0.11843 
 (0.02359) (0.02355) (0.04689) (0.04635) (0.06431) (0.10951) 
CR3 -0.06514 0.18972 1.13712** 0.01079 0.35228 1.55623 
 (0.11760) (0.17397) (0.49730) (0.26825) (0.41161) (0.96457) 
GDPG 0.01334 -0.00365 -0.02780 -0.05292* -0.04933 -0.13810** 
 (0.00889) (0.00753) (0.01877) (0.02714) (0.03870) (0.06213) 
INF 0.03108** 0.02591 0.16752*** 0.00211 0.04916** 0.16779*** 
 (0.01488) (0.01930) (0.03450) (0.01702) (0.02065) (0.03797) 
Observations 805 807 805 308 308 308 
p-value for AR(1) test 0.028 0.034 0.072 0.000 0.062 0.119 
p-value for AR(2) test 0.093 0.973 0.101 0.103 0.829 0.173 
p-value for Hansen-J test 0.144 0.102 0.120 0.300 0.089 0.290 
 
Source and note: Authors’ calculation. The definition of variables follows Table 1. Dynamic panel data models use the two-step GMM dynamic panel 
estimators with Windmeijer’s robust finite sample correction, taking into account the orthogonal deviation transformations of instruments. Dynamic panel data 
models are valid if AR(2) test and Hansen-J test are not rejected. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
